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The property tax has been in the spotlight for almost two decades now, beginning with
Proposition 13 in California that attacked the growth of the property tax with a sledgehammer,
and spreading to other states with various revolts, reforms, restraints and even a few unsuccessful
efforts at total repeal. In order to understand what has happened to the property tax, and where it
may or should be headed, we need to look back at the evolution of this very important revenue
source over the course of the 20th century.
Turn back to the golden age of the property tax, if ever it existed, which would have been a
century ago. At that time, land and improvements were the tax base and also primary form of
wealth, so the property tax was much closer to being a tax on wealth than it is today. Agriculture
was still the main occupation, and many farmers only saw cash once a year at harvest time and
paid their taxes and stocked their larders at that time. The revenues collected were used mainly to
pay for property-related services, including farm-to-market roads and law enforcement which
protected property rights. In many jurisdictions, property tax assessors did not attempt to
measure market value, that elusive concept that has brought the property tax so heavily under
fire. Instead, assessors relied on various proxies for market value, such as acreage, bathrooms,
windows, doors, or furnaces.
Between then and now, two important things happened to the property tax. First, it went from
being a state and local tax to being mainly a local tax, as states shifted during the Great
Depression primarily to sales taxes and later to income taxes. This development took some
pressure off the property tax. Even at the local level, the property tax share in total revenue has
gradually declined over the decades as local governments increased their dependence on state
aid, fees and charges, and local sales taxes. This revenue diversification also took some pressure
off the property tax. But in another dimension, the role of the property tax expanded in the 1950s
and 1960s, as it became a major source of school funding during a period when education
spending was growing very rapidly. The demands of the baby boomers as they passed through
the public schools between 1951 and 1982 forced up property tax demands across the nation,
except in those few states like Hawaii that rely almost entirely on state funding for schools.
Now let's fast forward to 1996, and ask ourselves why so many people love to hate the property
tax. Economists focus on equity and efficiency issues, which are certainly important; but a
significant part of the attack on the property tax relates to perception, so we cannot explore the
property tax revolt without at least a cursory consideration of public relations issues.
Efficiency Issues
The first efficiency issue is the gradual weakening of the link between tax and benefits. The
decay of the tax-benefit link has been reinforced by the increased share of elderly in the voting
and taxpaying population. This group has less direct interest in the schools but is more likely to

vote than younger adults. While schools may have been the original source of frustration,
however, the anti-property tax movement also weakened the acceptability of the property tax as a
source of funding for non-education local services.
The second efficiency issue is the perverse locational effects of property taxes, with rising taxes
inducing flight and declining property values and further increases in the tax rate. Over time,
particularly in areas where cities have difficulty expanding, the reliance on property taxes tends
to increase inequities between areas in the tax benefit package offered by different residential
locations. This effect is often most visible in large cities, encouraging suburbs to "free ride" on
their metropolitan hosts. Another effect is to encourage the growing trend toward creation of
gated (or closed) communities that provide a large share of their own local public services,
leaving the lower- to middle-income households that cannot afford the entry price into such
communities to make do with poorer services.
The third efficiency issue is the competitive effects, often described as "the race to the bottom."
Competition between cities to attract industrial and commercial development and to attract or
retain higher-income residents often takes the form of cutting property taxes and services and
shifting to fees for services, thus underfunding the "social benefit" component of local public
services while expanding production of those services that are least public in nature, such as
recreation programs, and golf courses.
The fourth efficiency issue is a less clear cut, because it involves weighing the costs and benefits
of mobility vs. stability. Economists generally come down on the side of encouraging mobility
for efficiency reasons, which is one reason they are concerned about the lock-in effects of some
forms of the property tax, particularly California's new acquisition value system, but, in general,
anywhere where sale is likely to trigger a reassessment. However, there is a sociological
dimension to the mobility-stability tradeoff, learned painfully by corporations like IBM and even
by the army, suggesting that there are social benefits to be derived from encouraging more stable
communities, so the jury is still out on which way this argument plays.
Equity Issues
Issues of fairness are probably the biggest source of taxpayer discontent. Equity is not a single
issue but a whole package of interrelated issues.
Perceived (and actual) inequities in assessment. The universal problem in taxation is to define
equality (the value of two parcels being equal) and relative inequality (parcel B is worth twice as
much as Parcel A). The solution is easiest in sales taxation, more difficult in income taxation and
most difficult of all in property taxation because parcels must be valued without actually
generating market income and/or being sold, either of which can be used to establish value.
Infrequent reassessment and rural areas with thin property markets exacerbate the problem of
determining relative property values.
Perceived inequities in structure. A majority of states use classified systems, either with different
types of properties assessed at different percentages of market value or with different types of
property subject to different tax rates. In addition, some properties are assessed at use value

(value in current use, which may be as farm or forest land) rather than market value, which is the
price the property would bring if sold for its most valuable use.
Inequities in tax bases between local jurisdictions. While school finance equalization schemes in
most states alleviate part of these differences, the remaining differences still impact on locational
decisions and on quality of schools and other public services.
Base erosion. The tax base shrinks when states or local governments grant partial or total
exemption for designated groups such as the elderly, industry, agriculture, or veterans. Base
erosion means a higher rate is required on non-exempt property to raise the needed revenue,
fueling the resentment of those who don't qualify for special treatment.
Theoretical disagreements over where the burden of the property tax lands. How much of the tax
is paid by consumers of property services (renters) and how much is a tax on capital absorbed by
owners?
Dual taxation. Those who choose to use private rather than public services (e.g., education,
security) usually continue to pay full property taxes. Unless they get partial relief, tax protests
are likely to escalate. However, if they are allowed to opt out of part or all of their local tax
obligation, the burden on those who remain in the system rises.
Public Relations Issues
Certainly part of the problem facing the property tax is an image problem. The public relations
problem is almost as multi-faceted as the equity issues.
The American dream. A man's home is his castle, and the property tax is perceived as a threat to
that dream and the sanctity of that castle. While a fixed rate mortgage can guarantee a monthly
payment for the dream, property taxes are a threat to a sometimes fragile ability to pay for that
dream.
A general anti-tax, anti-government environment. In such a situation, the high-profile property
tax becomes the handiest target to attack.
Confusion and lack of understanding. Property tax bills and assessment reports are complicated,
as are the procedures for determining valuation. The rules determining other taxes--the sales tax
and even the income tax--are less difficult to interpret.
The big bill effect. The property tax is paid annually, unlike most other taxes, in a county where
virtually everything else is on the monthly installment plan.
The ratcheting effects of infrequent reassessment. Sudden jumps in assessment have been the
fuel for taxpayer revolts in many places.
Multiple users of the tax base. A single taxpayer may be paying property taxes to a city, county,
school district, and one or more special districts, making it difficult to determine who is to blame

for a tax increase.on a single combined bill. Often it is hard for taxpayers to figure out which
local government, and exactly what kinds of spending increases are responsible for a tax
increase. Unfocused anger is directed at all governments using the property tax, not just the one
raising taxes.
The bearer of multiple burdens. The property tax must not only fund schools and city and county
services but also must do its share in offering industrial location incentives, attracting retirees,
protecting long-time property owners, and supporting farmers. All of these incentives erode the
property tax base, and a higher rate is necessary to make up the lost revenue.
Lessons from Economic Research
What have economists learned about the property tax that might be helpful? We've learned that,
as economists have argued for decades, that the property tax is indeed capitalized in the value of
the property--one recent article even estimated the discount rate to be about 4 percent -- but that
the value of the services and amenities the property tax supports are also capitalized in the
property, so the selling price of the property reflects both tax levels and services for a particular
jurisdiction.
We've learned the political truth behind the economic proposition that the distortions in
economic decision-making from a tax rise with the square of the tax rate! So we know more
today about how far we can push the tax rate before we start to systematically eat away at the
base that supports it, and far more about the long-term risks of politically engineered base
erosion to satisfy special interests.
We've learned, in fact we always knew, although we haven't been able to communicate it to
politicians/ legislators, that the long-run effects of any change are usually quite different from the
short-run effects. The steady deterioriation of California's local public services for two decades
after Prop 13 is a case in point.
We've learned to take a more complex and institutional view of the distribution of the property
tax burden between owners and users, recognizing that in a complex world of thin markets and
imperfect competition the burden may fall more heavily on users in some areas and owners in
others.
Whither the Property Tax?
The events of the last two decades have made it clear that the property tax is in a state of
transition. The four Rs of responses are repeal, restraint, relief, reform; and the hardest of these is
reform.
The passion for the quick fix is reflected in the aborted efforts to repeal the property tax in both
South Carolina and Michigan in recent years. Since there is no good substitute, remnants stay in
place, like kudzu roots, to grow back.

The second line of offense against the property tax has been restraint from its beginnings in
Proposition 13 to various tax and spending limitations across most of the country. If property
taxes are indeed an uncontrollable weed like kudzu, then restraint can be viewed as a way to train
this weed, as Japanese gardeners do with the more tolerable bonsai weed.
A third approach is relief, which usually means attacking the symptoms of distress by appeasing
the noisiest taxpayers, whether they are homeowners, industrialists, farmers, or the elderly.
The fourth approach -- most complex, most challenging, and least amenable to sound bites -- is
to reform the property tax for a new century by diagnosing its weaknesses and restructuring it so
as to reduce those weaknesses.
Approaches to a Modern Property Tax: Efficiency Issues
The property tax can continue to do yeoman's service well into the 21st century if these problems
can be addressed. There has been a tendency to a patchwork approach, resulting in state and local
property tax systems that look more like a crazy quilt than a well-designed and well-ordered
system of payment for public services. None of the fixes suggested here are unique, but it is
useful to sort them according to which criticism of the property tax each response appears to
address..
Weak link between taxes and benefits. This is the oldest issue and therefore the one with the
longest list of possible remedies. Remedies almost certainly include rethinking school financing.
Perhaps the cost of public education should fall more heavily on state's nonproperty taxes or on
industry, which uses fewer local services but has a big investment in education both for workers
and for employee children to attract and retain workers. While the quality of schools has
historically been reflected in property values, the link is increasingly attenuated with more
affluent elderly, more private schools and home schooling. There is, in fact, a strong national
trend toward greater state assumption of a role in school financing.
Discouraging investment in improvements. There is ample economic rationale for reweighting
the balance of taxable value between site rents and improvements, since the value of taxfinanced amenities and services enhances the value of the site rather than the value of the
buildings on the site.The notion of site rents, or the single tax on land, goes back more than a
century to Henry George's Progress and Poverty.
Distortions rise with the square of the tax rate. A change in the mix of local revenue sources so
as to reduce the share of the property tax has somewhat alleviated this problem. The property tax
still has a role to play in capturing the value of site-specific amenities and services, however.
Locational effects. Some of the locational distortions of the property tax in the current decade
may reflect the declining role of federal and state grants as a tool of equalization, a trend we can
expect to continue in the next decade. This aid performed an important equalizing function both
within and between states. To the extent that the disparities in resources among districts are
reduced by equalizing grants, there will be less incentive to relocate from poor to rich areas
solely because of the relative attractiveness of the local tax-service package. In contradiction to

the economists' naive faith that all processes are equilibrating processes, the locational effects of
property taxes continue to exacerbate the segregation of housing and communities into rich and
poor, each with their separate and unequal tax bases. Some states have addressed this problem
directly with more state aid or state assumption of certain responsibilities; others have targeted
industrial location incentives to their poorest areas as a way to equalize tax bases between
jurisdictions. Easier annexation also offers a partial solution to the decay of the inner city,
allowing these cities to incorporate their suburban "parasites." There is a growing body of
research showing that cities that can expand easily do much better than those that are confined to
old boundaries or find annexation very difficult.
. Mobility vs. stability The established wisdom is that efficency requires workers to be mobile, to
respond to locational opportunities; but location is getting less important as industry gets more
footloose, and workers are resisting relocation for a lot of reasons unrelated to property taxes,
such as spousal careers and children and uncertain futures even if they do move, and loss of
loyalties to downsizing companies with overpaid CEOs.. It's not clear that it's in the national
interest to encourage retirees to abandon their friends and support systems and move to where
the weather is mild and the taxes are low, but that's what they're doing, and it's those low
property taxes in the South, a holdover from the "land-is-wealth" mentality of a century ago, that
are an important part of the incentive to move. It's not even clear that moving those workers and
their families is good for marriage or good for children or good for communities. So maybe, just
maybe, the property tax system ought to be slanted in the direction of low turnover, contrary to
the conventional wisdom. Which may mean something like the California acquisition value
system, which favors the immobile, who turn out to be disproportionately poor and elderly--or at
least a system slanted toward reassessment at time of sale, or toward collecting a larger share of
the tax as a one time transfer fee and less in annual property taxes.
Approaches to a Modern Property Tax: Equity Issues
Economists may never totally resolve the distribution of the property tax burden between
consumption and capital, and it's not a burning question for most people. Instead, the focus is on
several more practical equity issues.
Perceived (and actual) inequities in assessment. Theoreticians, policy-makers, and practitioners
have already explored the countless ways in which assessment can be improved or simplified.
Pooling data among adjacent areas with low turnover and a limited number of parcels will
provide rural areas with a better assessment base. Implementing some variant of an acquisition
value system, with major reassessments occurring only at the time of sale, is another option that
provides a solid market foundation for any change in assessed value. [ In California, property is
only reassessed at the time of sale. Otherwise, it is valued at its acquisition price plus an
increment of 2 percent per year to adjust for estimated increases in value.] A shift to state
administration could offer greater uniformity, scale economies, and a larger pool of sales data,
but at the cost of the local knowledge that informs the city or county assessor. Finally, many
states have looked to a better and more effective appeals process as a way to address assessment
concerns. All of these solutions can alleviate but never eliminate the assessment problem that lies
at the core of the anti-property tax feelings.

Perceived inequities in structure. Classified property tax systems involve political choices about
the distribution of the tax burden. Those choices are then further modified by various special
exemptions, rollbacks, incentives, aimed at either "deserving," "desirable," or politically
effective groups such as homeowners, industry, agriculture, or the elderly. Such political choices
are subject to constant tinkering, but some tinkering does seem to reduce the level of
dissatisfaction, indicating an improvement in perceived equity.
Protecting the poor and the elderly from a burden that is excessive relative to their incomes.
There are stock solutions to these problems that have been around for decades, various forms of
homestead exemptions and circuit breakers. As the elderly become less likely to be poor,
lawmakers will eventually have to bite the bullet and make these distributional devices meanstested in order to avoid too much base erosion and some questionable locational incentives.
Already, in my state of South Carolina, which has been attracting wealthy retirees to it coastal
and mountain areas, long-time residents question the need for a $20,000 homestead exemption
on a $400,000 home owned by someone whose income is well above the state average just
because that person is 65 or older.
Bearer of multiple burdens. The property tax is expected to be the major player in such diverse
goals as attracting industry, financing education, protecting the elderly, encouraging agriculture,
and supporting local services. Some of these goals result in serious base erosion, which reduces
both the efficiency (i.e., neutrality in choices about investing/locating) and equity of the property
tax. Perhaps a flat property tax should be higher on the agenda than a flat income tax! At a
minimum, we should resist further base erosion. Ideally, we would roll back some of the existing
exemptions in exchange for lower rates.
Approaches to a Modern Property Tax: Public Relations Issues
The problems of perception and communication that plague the property tax derive primarily, as
we have seen, from multiple local governments using the same base, from the sticker shock of
infrequent assessments, and from the failure to make the link between taxes and services. The
multiple users problems is less an issue of property tax than of how local service delivery is
organized. The sticker shock problem calls for more regular reassessment ør reassessment only at
time of sale with inflation adjustments in between (the California acquisition value system).
Finally, local governments need to do a better job of explaining how they use their funds and
how
A 21st Century Property Tax
If we put these concerns and patchwork solutions together, what does the Property Tax of the
21st century look like? The following observations represent a mix of forecasting and
prescription:
1. The property tax is still here, contrary to rumors of its imminent demise.
2. The ideal property tax of the 21st century has lower rates, a broader base, and fewer
exemptions, limiting distortions and increasing equity. This change is going to be hard to

bring about; partly because it's a lot easier to create exemptions than to eliminate them,
and partly because newer forms of wealth are more difficult to find and tax.
3. The property tax continues to finance most city and county services, but with a shift away
from property tax financing of education toward a larger state role relying on broad-based
income and sales taxes.
4. There will be an increased use of special levies on properties to fund infrastructure and
special services. The impact fee is a membership fee for joining a city that has attributes
of a club, whose members have already paid for infrastructure, much like a sailing club
with an initiation fee and annual membership dues.
5. The property tax of the 21st century will be more heavily supplemented by alternative
revenue sources, especially fees, and state aid, a trend under way for several decades that
can be expected to continue.
6. Structurally, this improved tax will have moved away from proxies for deserving a tax
break on equity grounds, like age, toward direct measure of need for relief, like income.
7. Some of the problems will have been addressed indirectly, not by reform, relief, restraint,
repeal of the property tax but by rethinking the way that local government is organized
with overlapping responsibilities, difficulties in annexing or letting cities expand, and
multiple users of the same tax base. That's called attacking the cause instead of treating
the symptoms.
8. Every state will continue to watch other states to see what they try and how it works, like
the acquisition value system in California.
9. Property tax administrators will have responded to the demand from the public for truth
in taxation by making sure citizens understand not just what they're paying and to whom,
but also what they're getting in exchange for their taxes.
10. The property tax will still be still at the bottom of the popularity list, but the revolt will
have receded somewhat.

Holley Ulbrich is coordinator of Community and Economic Development at the Strom Thurmond Institute of
Government and Public Affairs at Clemson University where she is Alumni Professor of Economics.

